SACAA Whistleblower Fired: When the Aviation Regulator Becomes the Story

By Garth Calitz

There is an uncomfortable question hanging over South African civil aviation this week: who watches the watchdog when the watchdog itself becomes part of the investigation?

That question has returned to the spotlight following the dismissal of South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) airworthiness inspector and former accident investigator Jeremiah Visser, who says he was fired after raising concerns about the investigation into the 2020 crash of SACAA's own Cessna Citation S550, registered ZS-CAR.

The story is complicated, controversial and, importantly, far from finished. SACAA disputes the characterisation of Visser's actions and says the disciplinary matter concerned his alleged breach of internal policies and contractual obligations rather than the correctness of the information contained in his manuscript. Visser, through his legal representatives, disputes that position.

For the South African aviation industry, however, the bigger question is one of institutional independence. On 23 January 2020, ZS-CAR, a Cessna Citation S550 operated by SACAA's Flight Inspection Unit, crashed in mountainous terrain near George during a calibration flight of the airport's navigational equipment.

Three SACAA employees died: Captain Thabiso Tolo, First Officer Tebogo Lekalakala and Flight Inspector Gugu Mnguni. The accident therefore wasn't simply another aircraft accident involving a private operator. It involved an aircraft owned and operated by the very organisation responsible for regulating South Africa's civil aviation system. That distinction matters.

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SACAA's initial investigation attributed the accident primarily to pilot error. The families of those who died were not satisfied with that conclusion and the investigation subsequently attracted considerable scrutiny.

The then Transport Minister Fikile Mbalula requested an independent investigation by the Ethiopian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau. The decision to involve an outside investigation was significant because SACAA had been both the regulator and the owner/operator of the aircraft. It is rather strange that they didn't request the US NTSB to collaborate on the inspection, as the aircraft was built in the USA.

The South African government itself acknowledged that the original investigation structure involved an Accident and Incident Investigation Division that was operationally attached to SACAA, although functionally reporting to the Minister.

The Ethiopian investigation broadly agreed that pilot error was the probable cause. But it also raised several issues concerning the operation and oversight of ZS-CAR. Among the matters reported were concerns surrounding the aircraft's flight data recorder and other regulatory and operational shortcomings. The Ethiopian investigation also recommended that responsibility for accident investigation be completely separated from the aviation oversight authority. That recommendation is arguably more important than the argument over who was ultimately responsible for the crash.

Visser had apparently been raising concerns about aspects of the ZS-CAR investigation for several years. He eventually used SACAA's internal Vuvuzela whistleblowing mechanism in March 2026 to make what he regarded as a protected disclosure. Following the disclosure, Visser was suspended and subsequently subjected to a disciplinary process that ended with his dismissal. SACAA's position is that the disciplinary action was related to the alleged improper use or disclosure of information and alleged breaches of its policies and employment obligations.

He says the material underlying his concerns came from publicly available information and his own analysis and that he had previously raised concerns internally. His legal representatives have rejected SACAA's argument that the information constituted proprietary material that could not be used in the manner he used it. This is where the story becomes considerably more uncomfortable.

Visser had prepared a manuscript dealing with the ZS-CAR accident and its investigation. In July 2026, SACAA went to court in an urgent attempt to prevent Visser from publishing or distributing the manuscript. That application was unsuccessful after the Gauteng High Court in Pretoria struck the urgent application from the roll with costs, according to Visser's legal representative.

The legal dispute does not establish that Visser's allegations are correct, nor does SACAA's opposition establish that they are wrong. That distinction is important because aviation safety investigations should ultimately be about evidence, not personalities. The danger for any regulator is that an employment dispute can begin to overshadow the underlying safety questions, and that is precisely what appears to be happening.

The aviation industry has long understood why accident investigation needs independence. An accident investigation is not and should never be primarily about punishment. Its purpose is to establish what happened, why it happened and what can be changed to prevent a recurrence.

That becomes particularly important when the organisation investigating an accident is also connected to the aircraft, operation, maintenance, oversight or regulatory decisions involved in the accident. The ZS-CAR case demonstrated that problem very clearly.

The Ethiopian investigation was brought in partly because of the potential conflict surrounding SACAA's dual role and, of course, the fallout that had already taken hold. Its recommendation for greater separation between accident investigation and aviation oversight therefore deserves continued attention. If the regulator is investigating an accident involving one of its own aircraft, questions about institutional independence are inevitable. If an employee of that regulator then raises concerns about the investigation and is subsequently dismissed, the questions become even more uncomfortable.

According to SACAA spokesperson Sisa Majola, the SACAA has no obligation to confirm or deny the correctness of the information contained in Visser's manuscript, a statement that should be treated with the contempt it deserves. Instead, its concern is that information allegedly obtained through his employment was used contrary to SACAA policies and contractual obligations.

From an employer's perspective, confidentiality obligations are obviously legitimate. Aviation regulators handle enormous quantities of sensitive information. Personnel cannot simply assume that everything they encounter at work becomes theirs to publish.

But aviation regulators also occupy a unique position. They are not ordinary commercial businesses protecting a customer database or corporate trade secrets. Their decisions can affect aircraft owners, operators, engineers, pilots, maintenance organisations and, ultimately, public safety. That creates a delicate balance between legitimate confidentiality and legitimate public-interest disclosure.

There is an additional layer of irony. SACAA itself provides mechanisms through which concerns can be reported, including channels for whistleblowing and reporting suspicious or potentially improper activity. Its public reporting information states that whistleblowers can receive written feedback after an investigation has been completed. SACAA also provides a mechanism for anonymous reporting of fraud and suspicious activities. The obvious question is therefore not whether SACAA should have confidentiality rules.

It should.

The question is whether an employee can make a protected disclosure concerning the regulator itself and remain confident that the disclosure will be assessed independently. That is a very different question.

South Africa does not have the luxury of treating aviation safety oversight as an ordinary bureaucratic exercise. The country has a sophisticated aviation industry, a substantial general aviation community, major international airlines, commercial operators, maintenance organisations and a large network of pilots and engineers. All of them depend on confidence in the regulator. That confidence doesn't mean everybody must agree with SACAA. Quite the opposite, A healthy regulator should be able to withstand difficult questions.

If an inspector believes something is wrong, the system should encourage him or her to raise the concern. If the concern is unfounded, an independent investigation should demonstrate that. If it is valid, the system should identify the problem and fix it. Either way, aviation wins.

The worst possible outcome is a situation where employees become afraid that raising uncomfortable safety questions could end their careers. It would be easy to turn this into a personality contest between Visser and SACAA, but that would miss the point. The important issue is whether South Africa's aviation safety architecture contains sufficient independence and protection for people who raise legitimate concerns.

The ZS-CAR accident already exposed questions about the separation between regulator, operator and investigator. The subsequent dispute involving an SACAA employee has now brought the issue back into the public arena. Visser has taken his concerns beyond SACAA, approaching the Transport Minister's office, the Public Protector and Parliament's Portfolio Committee on Transport.

That means the matter is no longer simply an internal employment dispute. It has become a question for the institutions responsible for overseeing South Africa's aviation regulator. The question should not be whether Jeremiah Visser is right simply because he is a whistleblower. Nor should it be assumed that SACAA is right simply because it is the regulator.

Every allegation needs evidence, every investigation needs independence, and every whistleblower needs due process. South Africa's aviation industry should therefore be closely watching what happens next. Because if an aviation inspector cannot safely question the work of the organisation responsible for aviation safety, the industry has a much bigger problem than one dismissed employee.

The real test now is whether the allegations will be independently examined on their merits. That is where aviation safety begins — with the courage to ask uncomfortable questions, and a system mature enough to answer them.