Who Is Investigating Aviation Accidents Now? South Africa Has a Board, a Law and More Than a Few Questions

By Garth Calitz

South Africa has officially entered a new era of aviation accident investigation. The Civil Aviation Amendment Act 22 of 2021 is now in force, the Aviation Safety Investigation Board (ASIB) has been established in law, and the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) has helpfully clarified that aircraft accident investigations are no longer its problem to explain. There is just one small detail. Who, precisely, is investigating aviation accidents in South Africa right now?

It is a fairly reasonable question. Aircraft continue to fly, accidents can still happen and investigators are occasionally required to establish why an aeroplane ended up somewhere other than where its pilot intended. One might therefore expect the identity and operational status of the organisation responsible for investigating those events to be readily available. Apparently, that would be expecting too much.

Flightline Weekly approached SACAA with a series of questions about the ASIB following the legislation's commencement on 12 October. We wanted to establish whether the Board was operational, who its members were, whether a chairperson had been appointed, what resources were available, and how ongoing investigations would be managed.

SACAA responded. And, in fairness, the authority did provide some useful background. Unfortunately, it also managed to leave the central question hanging rather comfortably in mid-air. The buck stops somewhere. We just need to find out where.

According to SACAA, the amended legislation establishes the ASIB as a juristic person reporting directly to the Department of Transport and the Minister of Transport. The Board is now responsible for investigating aircraft accidents and incidents under the applicable legislation. That sounds reassuring. There is a law, there is a Board, and there is an organisation legally responsible for the job.

SACAA also explained that the previous Accidents and Incidents Investigation Division (AIID) operated under a Ministerial Order introduced in May 2016. The division reported functionally to the Minister and Department of Transport, while SACAA provided administrative support. The regulator insists that it had no influence over investigations, no access to investigation files and no involvement in authorising reports.

Fine. That is useful clarification. But our questions were not primarily about who was responsible in 2016. They were about who is responsible today, how the transition has been implemented, and whether the new structure is ready to function. On those questions, SACAA's answer was essentially: please ask someone else.

The authority informed Flightline Weekly that it could no longer entertain questions relating to ASIB and aircraft accident investigations and referred us to the Department of Transport. This leaves the aviation community playing a rather peculiar game of institutional ping-pong. The regulator points to the Board, the Board falls under Transport, and Transport is now the next stop on the enquiry tour. Somewhere in this administrative relay race, one hopes, there is a qualified investigator with a clipboard.

SACAA, rather bullishly, said the ASIB Board was announced by Parliament on 11 June 2026. After a rather lengthy search, we found that on 11 June 2026, Parliament published a statement confirming that the National Assembly had approved a list of seven recommended candidates for appointment to the Aviation Safety Investigation Board. Parliament explicitly stated that the names would be sent to the Minister of Transport, who would select and formally appoint the final five Board members. This contradicts the SACAA statement somewhat.

The existence of a Board in legislation, or the announcement of its establishment, does not automatically tell the public whether all members have been appointed, whether a chairperson is in place, whether investigators and support personnel are available, or whether the organisation has the funding and infrastructure needed to do its job. Perhaps all these arrangements are complete. Perhaps the ASIB is operating smoothly and has everything it needs. If so, a straightforward statement confirming that would be useful. If not, the aviation industry deserves to know what interim arrangements are in place.

There is a substantial difference between establishing an institution on paper and ensuring that it can investigate an accident, secure evidence, interview witnesses, examine wreckage, analyse technical data and produce an independent report. A legal mandate does not inspect a fractured component, download a flight-data recorder or interview a witness. People with appropriate training, equipment and authority do that. And they need to know who they work for.

Flightline Weekly specifically asked SACAA about the Sling 2 accident at Knysna.

We wanted to know which organisation was responsible for the investigation, who was leading it, whether it would proceed under the new ASIB framework or the previous AIID arrangements, and whether a preliminary or final report was anticipated. The response did not answer those questions.

To be clear, this does not establish that the Knysna investigation has stalled, that no investigators have been appointed, or that the ASIB is not operational. SACAA's response simply does not provide enough information to establish the current position. But that is precisely the problem.

When legislation changes the institutional arrangements for investigating aviation accidents, the public should not have to guess which authority is handling a particular case. Pilots, aircraft owners, operators, insurance companies and the families affected by accidents have a legitimate interest in knowing who is investigating, where enquiries should be directed and how the process will proceed. We are not asking for confidential evidence or premature conclusions about the cause of an accident. We are asking who is responsible for investigating it. That should not require an archaeological expedition through government departments.

SACAA also made a point of explaining that it has no access to AIID investigation files and that there is therefore no need to transfer files from SACAA to the ASIB. That may well be correct. If SACAA did not hold the files, there would be no reason to transfer them from the regulator. But the question of file ownership is not necessarily the same as the question of operational continuity.

What arrangements ensure that ongoing investigations continue without interruption? Who is responsible for cases that began before 12 October but remain open? Who authorises new investigations, and who is the designated point of contact for the aviation community?

These are not necessarily questions about moving boxes of paperwork from one office to another. They are questions about responsibility, authority and continuity. We trust the answers exist somewhere beyond the filing cabinet.

There is an important principle at stake here.

An independent accident investigation function must be able to examine the circumstances of an accident without pressure from the regulator, an operator, a manufacturer or any other interested party. Its purpose is to identify causes and contributing factors, draw safety lessons and make recommendations that help prevent future accidents.

SACAA says the former AIID already operated independently of the regulator under the Ministerial Order. The Amendment Act now formalises a structure under which the ASIB is a separate juristic person reporting to the Department and Minister of Transport. That is a significant legislative development.

However, independence should not be confused with invisibility. An independent investigation body must still be identifiable, contactable and accountable for carrying out its statutory responsibilities. The public needs to know who leads the organisation, how its work is funded, how reports are published and how safety recommendations are communicated and followed up. Otherwise, we risk creating the administrative equivalent of an aircraft disappearing into cloud: we know it was there, we know where it was supposed to go, but we are not entirely sure what happened next.

SACAA has made its position clear: the ASIB is responsible for aircraft accident and incident investigations under the new legislation, and questions about its establishment and operations should be directed to the Department of Transport. Very well. That is where the next questions must go.

The Department should confirm whether the ASIB is fully operational, identify its appointed members and chairperson, explain its staffing and funding arrangements, and clarify how ongoing investigations are being managed.

These are basic implementation questions, not attempts to undermine the new framework. Indeed, if the transition has been completed successfully, answering them should be an opportunity to demonstrate that the new system is working as intended.

South Africa's aviation community has every reason to support genuinely independent accident investigations. What it should not have to support is a system in which the legislation has commenced but basic questions about the responsible institution remain unanswered.

There is a distinctly South African quality to this situation. A law has commenced, a Board has apparently been announced, responsibilities have been assigned, and a regulator has politely referred the media elsewhere. Everyone appears to know where the responsibility lies. We are simply trying to establish who is actually carrying it out. To avoid any misunderstanding, Flightline Weekly is not alleging that accident investigations have stopped or that the ASIB is incapable of doing its job. The available response does not support either conclusion.

What it does show is that SACAA has not answered the operational questions put to it and has directed those questions to the Department of Transport. So, here is the question again, without the legislation, the institutional history or the administrative choreography:

Who is investigating aviation accidents in South Africa today, who is leading those investigations, and where can the public find confirmation that the new system is fully operational?

It should not be a mystery worthy of an accident investigation in its own right. After all, aviation safety depends on knowing what happened, why it happened and what must be done to prevent it happening again. Before we can get to those answers, perhaps we could start with identifying the people responsible for finding them.

The Department of Transport has the floor. We suggest it use the opportunity to make itself heard before the next accident raises the question for us.