SACAA’s State of Aviation: Impressive Numbers, Uncomfortable Questions

By Garth Calitz

South Africa’s aviation regulator celebrates international safety credentials and a clean audit record, but rising general aviation fatalities and questions over regulatory accountability offer a less comfortable picture.

The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) had plenty to celebrate at its State of Aviation media conference on 13 October. South Africa remains among the world’s best-performing states for aviation safety oversight; the regulator has recorded another clean audit, and it has reportedly achieved most of its strategic targets.

Yet behind the impressive percentages lies a more complicated story. General aviation fatalities have risen sharply, a major legislative change has just taken effect, and the regulator faces questions about how it applies its oversight responsibilities in practice. For a regulator responsible for keeping South African aviation safe, the challenge is not simply to demonstrate that its systems meet international standards. It is to show that those systems deliver measurable safety outcomes. And that is where the numbers begin to demand a little more explanation.

SACAA Commissioner of Civil Aviation Poppy Khoza highlighted South Africa’s 94.99% score in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s safety oversight assessment. The result places South Africa seventh globally and first in Africa. It is a substantial achievement. The assessment examines the effectiveness of a state’s aviation legislation, technical personnel, licensing and certification processes, surveillance systems and ability to address safety deficiencies.

But an oversight score is not a national aviation safety certificate declaring everything satisfactory. It measures the effectiveness of a regulatory framework against defined standards; it does not guarantee that accidents will not happen or that every operator is complying with every requirement.

According to SACAA, the number of recorded general aviation accidents fell from 133 in the 2024/25 financial year to 76 in 2025/26, a reduction of approximately 43%. That is encouraging. However, fatal accidents increased from four to 17, while fatalities climbed from seven to 24. In other words, fewer accidents were recorded, but a considerably greater number proved fatal. The fatality increase is particularly stark and cannot be dismissed simply because the overall accident total improved.

SACAA has identified human factors, mechanical and engine problems, and structural or airframe failures among the leading causes in completed accident investigations. The authority says it is working with industry on a general aviation safety strategy that includes risk-management initiatives, safety seminars and publications. A safety strategy is a starting point, not a safety outcome.

Khoza also pointed to South Africa’s longstanding record of zero fatal aircraft accidents in scheduled commercial airline operations, maintained for more than four decades. That is a record worth recognising. It also illustrates why aviation safety needs to be considered across different operational environments rather than reduced to a single national score.

Scheduled airline operations, private flying, flight training, aerial work and business aviation face different operating conditions and risk profiles. General aviation therefore requires targeted interventions rather than a broad assurance that South Africa performs well internationally. The challenge is to turn the regulator’s oversight capability into practical safety improvements throughout the sector, including among smaller operators and private aircraft owners who may not have the resources of a major airline. The very real possibility of overregulation must also be kept in mind, as this in itself can lead to an unsafe operating environment

The Cape Town Stadium flypast by two Airlink aircraft on 29 August 2026 was another significant issue addressed at the conference. It also requires precise terminology. SACAA is conducting a regulatory compliance review of the flypast, not an investigation. The distinction is important because the review examines whether the operation complied with applicable regulatory requirements and the conditions attached to its approval. A pertinent question that needs answering is "What exactly did the regulator approve"

SACAA subsequently undertook compliance verification; Airlink volunteered to provide flight-data recordings. The regulator subsequently requested further information from the airline, which was immediately provided. Once the CAA completed its verification process, it issued a report to the airline, inviting Airlink to respond to the report’s findings and recommendations. Airlink was initially given 15 days to respond and requested additional time. SACAA extended the deadline to 15 October 2026.

At the conference, Khoza said the authority would assess Airlink’s response before deciding on any appropriate action. She emphasised that approval of a flypast did not remove an operator’s responsibility to comply with aviation regulations. That is a reasonable regulatory principle. Approval is not a blanket exemption from compliance, nor does it transfer all responsibility from the operator to the regulator. However, the existence of a review report does not, by itself, establish that Airlink committed a breach. Nor does the possibility of enforcement action amount to a finding of wrongdoing.

Airlink has maintained that the flypast was conducted within the approved limits. On 14 October, the airline said it had cooperated with SACAA and voluntarily provided flight-data recordings and other relevant documentation. It also said the operation had been planned and rehearsed with safety as a priority. The outstanding issue is whether SACAA’s assessment identifies any regulatory non-compliance and, if so, what evidence supports that conclusion.

Until Airlink’s response has been considered and the regulatory process completed, it would be premature to declare either that the airline breached the rules or that the review has cleared it of all concerns.

There is also a broader question of transparency. SACAA has indicated that these compliance matters are ordinarily handled directly with the affected operator, unlike formal aircraft accident or incident investigations, which follow a different process. That approach may protect due process, but the public should still be able to understand the final regulatory outcome and the reasons for any corrective or enforcement decision, subject to legitimate confidentiality and legal constraints. For now, the review remains a process awaiting its next step—not a concluded case.

The conference also came at a significant moment for aviation regulation. The Civil Aviation Amendment Act 22 of 2021 came into effect on 12 October 2026, introducing changes to South Africa’s regulatory framework. One of the most important changes is the separation of aircraft accident investigation functions from SACAA through the establishment of a distinct Aviation Safety Investigation Board. The intention is to strengthen investigative independence and distinguish the investigation of accidents from the regulator’s responsibility for compliance and enforcement.

The separation of accident investigation from regulatory enforcement is an important institutional development that they indusrty have been advocating for some time. An accident investigation should seek to establish what happened, why it happened and how similar occurrences can be prevented—not to allocate blame or impose punishment.

But legislation alone cannot guarantee independence. The new board will need appropriate expertise, funding, institutional autonomy and transparent procedures. Its relationship with SACAA, operators and other state bodies will need to work in practice, not merely on paper. The transition must also preserve continuity. Existing investigations, outstanding reports and the transfer of responsibilities need to be managed without unnecessary delays or uncertainty. The real test will come when the new structure has to deal with a difficult case involving competing interests, uncomfortable findings or pressure for a particular outcome.

SACAA reported a surplus of R62.7 million for the 2025/26 financial year, compared with a budgeted surplus of R27.6 million. It also reported achieving 39 of its 40 strategic targets, a performance rate of 97.5%, and receiving a clean, unqualified audit from the Auditor-General. These are positive administrative and financial indicators and deserve praise. They suggest that the organisation has maintained financial discipline and performed well against most of its stated objectives. The meaningful question is what those targets measured, which target was missed, and whether the performance framework adequately reflects outcomes experienced by aviation operators and the public.

For an authority whose responsibilities include safety oversight, licensing, certification and surveillance, performance should ultimately be judged not only by internal targets and financial results but also by the quality, consistency and practical impact of its regulatory work. The public and the aviation industry should be able to see how the money collected and spent supports those responsibilities.

Khoza also addressed the January 2020 crash of SACAA aircraft ZS-CAR, which killed three SACAA employees. The Ethiopian accident investigation authority published its final report in January 2022. SACAA subsequently raised concerns about inaccuracies in the report and pursued an appeal. A judicial inquest is expected to examine the circumstances surrounding the deaths.

The case remains a reminder of why independence, transparency and public confidence matter in accident investigation. Where serious concerns persist about an investigation’s conclusions, the process for resolving those concerns needs to be clear and credible.

The important outstanding questions concern the inquest’s progress, the timetable for further proceedings and how the relevant findings will be made available to the public. It would be inappropriate to speculate about the eventual conclusions. Equally, the passage of time makes clear communication about the process increasingly important.

The State of Aviation conference presented a regulator with credible achievements to report: a strong ICAO oversight score, a clean audit, high reported target achievement and a significant legislative transition. But it also highlighted issues that cannot be resolved by good percentages alone. General aviation fatalities have increased substantially, the effectiveness of the proposed safety interventions remains to be demonstrated, and the new accident-investigation arrangements must establish their independence in practice.

The Airlink flypast review is another test of regulatory credibility, although it must remain in its proper context. SACAA must assess the airline’s response fairly, apply the relevant rules consistently and explain the outcome without prejudging the matter; the lack of communication has already led to certain media organisations making wild, unfounded statements, including the possibility of the Airline being grounded.

None of these issues cancels out the regulator’s achievements. They do, however, demonstrate why performance claims must be examined alongside operational outcomes. South African aviation needs a regulator that is technically competent, financially sound, consistent in its decisions and prepared to explain its actions. It also needs an industry willing to comply with the rules and to engage constructively when safety concerns arise.

At the end of the day, international rankings and clean audits are welcome. Fewer fatal accidents, effective oversight and public confidence are the results that matter most. The next chapter of South African aviation safety will be judged not by how confidently the regulator presents its scorecard, but by what changes on the ground—and in the air.